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Martijn Van Den Brink*
One of the most pressing issues concerning the free movement of EU citizens 
is from what moment in time mobile EU citizens are to be entitled to social 
benefits in the host Member State. This matter raises profound questions of 
justice, which have recently been attracting considerable attention. Like 
Floris de Witte's monograph Justice in the EU,1 also Neuvonen's Equal 
Citizenship and Its Limits in EU Law: We the Burden focuses on the EU 
citizenship case law and does so through the discourse of justice. Both 
authors have their own take on these issues. While de Witte's perspective is 
more communitarian,2 Neuvonen draws upon principles of egalitarian 
justice, offering a new and original perspective to the (case) law that governs 
the position of EU citizens who have moved to another Member State and 
claim benefits there. One of the novelty aspects of this book is the less 
doctrinal approach to the issue at stake. Looking at an array of non-legal 
disciplines, Neuvonen tries to explain why equality of treatment between EU 
citizens is important for the realisation of substantive justice within the EU. 
The book is to be commended for what it aims for. Yet, as I will explain, it 
suffers from several shortcomings and at times raises more questions than it 
answers. Before engaging in a critical discussion of the book, I will briefly set 
out the structure and main arguments of Neuvonen's analysis. The book is 
divided in two parts. The first offers an overview of the development of the 
non-discrimination principle and explains how this has created an equality 
problem: the equality principle remains premised upon individual 
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responsibility, namely the responsibility to be economically or socially active. 
The second part offers solutions to this problem. 
The first part comprises three chapters. The first offers a historical overview 
of the development of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of 
nationality to a principle of equal citizenship within the EU and explains how 
these developments have given rise to an equality problem. Is the equality 
principle an independent principle of EU citizenship or does it remain 
dependent on the exercise of free movement?3 The second chapter puts more 
substance to this critique and offers a detailed analysis of the right of the 
economically active and inactive EU citizens to equal treatment in the host 
Member State. This analysis, Neuvonen claims, demonstrates that the 
potential of EU citizenship has remained unfulfilled and that the equality 
problem remains: there is no adequate consideration of 'what differential 
treatment means for the equality of relationships between EU citizens'.4 The 
third chapter concludes the first part and offers a theoretical critique. It is 
suggested, in essence, that the EU's equality principle is still premised upon 
'ideals of individual responsibility and agency'.5 This individualistic approach 
violates principles of egalitarian justice. 
The second part builds upon the first and suggests a number of ways to create 
more just and equal relationships among EU citizens. The fourth chapter 
constructs EU citizenship as a source of subjectivity on the basis of feminist 
theory and, additionally, psycho-dynamic and phenomenological theories. 
According to Neuvonen, EU citizens' sense of subjectivity only emerges 
through social relations with other EU citizens. The last chapter explains 
what this ought to imply when applied in practice. Instead of an 'activity-
based ideal of equality', 'more weight must be given to the impact which 
[legitimate differential treatment] may have on the equality of horizontal 
relationships between EU citizens'.6 Such an interpersonal perspective would 
pay more attention 'to how the refusal to grant equal treatment, may create 
an obstacle to the Union citizen's ability to integrate into the society of the 
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host Member State and to relate to the nationals of that state on an equal 
basis'.7 
This brief overview does not do justice to the depth of Neuvonen's analysis, 
though the manifold theoretical perspectives introduced above will give the 
reader of this review an idea of the book's ambitions. As a result, the book 
offers an interesting and innovative perspective. 
Having said that, the argument is not always convincing or clear. I will focus 
on four shortcomings here: (1) the project is methodologically not without 
problems; (2) the argument is not always consistent; (3) the argument remains 
obscure at times; (4) open ends remain.My first concern is about the project's 
methodology. I agree with Neuvonen that traditional positivist approaches, 
which offer an internal perspective but fail to take into account insights from 
other disciplines, are methodologically limited. The book therefore tries to 
complement a more traditional legal analysis with insights from non-legal 
disciplines.8 Such an external approach to the study of EU citizenship indeed 
is beneficial. Unfortunately, the interdisciplinary perspective is not pushed 
far enough and was introduced too late in the analysis.  
The first part of the book remains largely uninformed by theory, while this 
should have been the point of departure. Only following an outline of the 
theoretical premises an examination about whether the law complies with 
them should have been carried out, ideally, adopting an interdisciplinary and 
deductive approach from the very beginning. Instead, the book reverses this 
order. The first chapter, for example, reads like a very traditional account on 
the nature of EU citizenship. The existence of 'reverse discrimination' is 
seemingly criticised and seen as a limitation imposed upon EU citizenship;9 
EU citizenship's core rights are different from those of a traditional 
citizenship;10 and EU citizenship will remain largely meaningless if it is not 
developed into a 'genuinely equal status'.11 
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Strikingly, these arguments are followed by the claim that 'the essence of the 
rights of EU citizenship depends on how we address the "still unanswered 
question of what Union citizenship actually is or ought to be"'.12 Ideally, it 
should have first been explained what EU citizenship is indeed supposed to 
be, in view of the author, before an account of what is problematic about EU 
citizenship could be offered.  
Notably, the claim that EU citizenship's core rights are different from 
traditional citizenship rights is profoundly disputable, and much depends on 
one's conceptualisation of EU citizenship. Some have suggested that EU 
citizenship is not unlike a 'federal citizenship', precisely because EU 
citizenship's core rights, the right to free movement and the right to non-
discrimination, are like that of a federal citizenship.13 Therefore, EU 
citizenship appears much alike a traditional citizenship. Of course, one may 
think that EU citizenship should depend less on the right to free movement, 
or that this right's current interpretation raises problems of its own. Whether 
that is the case, however, depends upon one's conception of justice, which is 
precisely why theory should have been the book's point of departure. 
Currently, theory merely serves to reinforce the arguments in the first 
chapters and, as I will explain below, does not do so with sufficient 
clarity.Unfortunately, the arguments seem inconsistent at times. The 
problem that informs the study is defined differently throughout the book 
and I am uncertain also about the precise solutions Neuvonen has in mind. 
At least three different problem definitions are given by the author. At the 
outset, it appears that the equality problem concerns the question of whether 
the non-discrimination principle is to be dependent on the free movement 
principles or should have an independent meaning.14 To me, it is hard to see 
how the principle of non-discrimination cannot, to a considerable extent, 
depend on the exercise of free movement by an EU citizen to another 
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Member State, and it is perhaps fortunate that the problem is redefined a 
little later. Subsequently, it is suggested that '[t]he core of the structural EU 
equality problem is that the residence-based scope of EU citizens' general 
right to equal treatment can easily lead to circularity in the application of the 
EU principle of equality'.15 This, I assume, also is not truly the equality 
problem Neuvonen wants to address in her book. Because if, as the author 
appears to argue, the circularity results from the ECJ's legal reasoning, all that 
would be required is for the Court to offer a more coherent and less circular 
argument. Only halfway through the book, after the principles of egalitarian 
justice have been discussed, does the problem that appears to truly animate 
the book truly emerge. This, in view of the author, is that 'the EU principle 
of equality suffers from a bias in favour of individual responsibility at the 
expense of just and equal relationships between EU citizens'.16 These 
different problem definitions could have been avoided had a solid theoretical 
base been introduced from the outset and had the problem the book seeks to 
address been presented against the backdrop of egalitarian principles of 
justice from the very beginning. This third, egalitarian justice-based, 
definition of the problem could then have been used from the start. 
Unfortunately, also the solution proposed is not entirely clear. From the 
reconstruction of EU citizenship as subjectivity, it follows that we should pay 
more attention 'to how the refusal to grant equal treatment may create an 
obstacle to the Union citizen's ability to integrate into the society of the host 
Member State and to relate to the nationals of that state on an equal basis'.17 
What remains unclear is what this ought to entail precisely. On the one hand, 
the suggestion is that limitations to the principle of equal treatment must be 
interpreted narrowly and that equality of outcomes is not necessarily the 
aim.18 On the other hand, the same page offers the suggestion that the current 
interpretation of Article 18 TFEU implies that those who belong deserve to be 
treated equally, whereas viewing EU citizens as full and equal subjects of EU 
law would suggest that those who are treated equally (will) belong.19 
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But this statement is, or at least very much appears to be, about equalities of 
outcome. Neuvonen appears to suggest that only by being treated equally do 
EU citizens belong and become full and equal subjects of EU law. Since the 
latter appears to be what Neuvonen's preferred conception of justice 
requires, it is difficult to see how derogations from the principle of non-
discrimination can remain tolerable. After all, for as long as equal treatment 
is not extended to all, certain categories of EU citizens will suffer in their 
social interactions with other EU citizens. This is exactly what Neuvonen is 
concerned with and what is required to give substance to EU citizens' 
subjectivity.My third concern with the book relates to its level of theoretical 
complexity and the fact that obscure concepts are not always explained with 
sufficient thoroughness. The theoretical part draws upon a wealth of 
theoretical insights. The ambition is not without potential pitfalls. Most EU 
lawyers will be unfamiliar with the theories used, including those of 
psychoanalysis or development psychology. A careful articulation of these 
disciplines' theoretical premises and insights is required, therefore, and so is 
a clear argument of how to best translate them into EU law. Unfortunately, 
the terminology used is often quite cryptic and is not always clarified by the 
author, making the argument difficult to follow at times. The book's second 
part is written densely and the language not always clear. For example, there 
are pages of nothing but expert quotes, yet forgetting to add an explanation 
for the benefit of an EU lawyer, illiterate in these areas, like the author of this 
review, of what is meant precisely.20 How the study of EU citizenship can 
benefit from insights derived from these disciplines, therefore, is sometimes 
hard to grasp. 
In addition to the disciplines mentioned this far, Neuvonen regularly makes 
minor detours to other theoretical fields to enrich the argument. Her exposé 
on feminist theory, for example, is complemented by insights from care 
ethics.21 Readers of this book can certainly expect an exciting rollercoaster 
ride through a variety of ideas. However, like many such rides, at times it may 
also evoke some feelings of dizziness. The book tries to do so much that it 
sometimes does too little. Due to the range of disciplines covered and the 
range of counter-arguments that need consideration, it sometimes seems like 
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there is insufficient space to reflect in depth upon all the literature being 
discussed. 
Take as an example the democratic critique of justice arguments, which 
somewhat unexpectedly appears on pages 116 and 117. According to this 
critique, 'objectively defining universally valid principles of justice seems 
impossible,22 and individuals, who are living under different circumstances 
and having different talents and preferences, disagree about what it means for 
society to constitute justice. .23 Therefore, it would be wrong to think that we 
can identify a correct conception of rights and justice and, therefore, also that 
judges are better situated to identify the correct or better view on the 
substantive results to be pursued by society. Theorists that have advanced 
this democratic critique tend to believe that disagreements about justice are, 
therefore, ideally to be resolved by our democratically elected institutions. 
Considering that Neuvonen suggests that 'the theory of democratic equality 
(…) forms the basis of [her] critique of the EU principle of equality'24 one 
would expect this democratic critique to be given full consideration. After all, 
would Neuvonen subscribe to the democratic critique, it should have great 
implications for her argument. Seemingly, she would have to acknowledge 
that her preferred conception of justice is ideally not imposed upon the EU 
by the ECJ, but to be adopted through more democratically legitimate 
procedures. Instead, she suggests that her solution to the equality problem 
'must be constructed by EU law because [it] will not emerge otherwise'.25 She 
does not specify in detail how this construction is to happen, but it appears 
that the Court should be made largely responsible for this.26 Why precisely 
the democratic critique is irrelevant for the remainder of the book is never 
really clarified. The question that remains, therefore, is how her argument 
can be squared with her insistence on democratic equality. The argument 
seems vulnerable to critique pointing out that most legal scholars place great 
weight on promoting equality of concern and respect [yet] all too often ignore 
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[individual's] intrinsic, as opposed to merely instrumental, links with the 
ability to participate on an equal basis to others in decisions concerning the 
very foundations of their political and social life.27 
Neuvonen emphasizes the importance of equal social rights, but she also 
claims that democratic equality forms the basis of her argument. 
Unfortunately, she does not explain how democratic equality is best to be 
realised within the EU. Admittedly, this is a topic that warrants an entirely 
different study, but the tension in the book's argument is considerable. If 
democratic equality truly is at the heart of her argument, it is problematic 
whether the author's suggestion is, in fact, that the ECJ must realise equal 
treatment of social rights. Since Neuvonen demonstrates awareness of these 
counter-arguments, one would have expected a more persuasive rejection of 
them. Having said this, the book offers an interesting perspective. The 
ambitions and the methodological premises as formulated at the book's 
outset should serve as an example for others. The book demonstrates that 
there is value in new critical and constructive perspectives that challenge 
dominant narratives. New perspectives also bring about new challenges. The 
use of novel disciplines requires a careful exposition of those disciplines' 
concepts and terminology to make them accessible to EU lawyers and will 
require a careful application to avoid problems of consistency. 
Unfortunately, the book does not always successfully overcome these 
challenges. I am uncertain, therefore, how persuasive Neuvonen's account of 
justice is and what precisely is to change for EU citizenship to comply with 
her preferred conception of justice. 
                                                 
27 Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the 
Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge University Press 2007) 152. 
